في البدء لابد لي ان اشير ان قراءاة متأنية لهذا التقرير وخصوصا ما جاء في الاستنتاج في اخر التقرير يحمل من يتصدى للمسؤلية اليوم في الوطن اتخاذ القرار الصعب في الاخذ بالاصلاح الجاد وليست المعالجة بالمهدئات لان المرض اصبح معروف للقاصي والداني وبالتالي لابد من الذهاب مباشرة لاجراء العمل الجراحي المناسب لانه لم يعد هناك المزيد من الوقت لاستمرار علاج اعراض المرض Yemen Total Score Indicators Social Economic Political/Military 2005 99.7 7.8 8.0 6.4 8.2 9.0 8.8 9.8 9.3 6.4 9.0 9.4 7.6 2006 96.6 7.8 6.7 7.0 8.2 9.0 7.8 8.8 8.2 7.2 9.0 9.4 7.5 Point Change -3.1 0 -1.3 +0.6 0 0 -1.0 -1.0 -1.1 +0.8 0 0 -0.1 Pct Change -2.6% 0% -13% +6% 0% 0% -10% -10% -11% +8% 0% 0% -1% Overview The Middle Eastern country of Yemen is located between Oman and Saudi Arabia and is bordered by the Arabian Sea, Gulf of Aden, and Red Sea. Its population of 21.5 million is predominantly Arab but also includes Afro-Arabs, South Asians, and Europeans. Islam, both Sunni and Shi’a, is the most prominent religion, with small numbers of Jews, Christians, and Hindus present as well. After the British withdrew from South Yemen in 1967, there was conflict between the north and south until they were unified in 1990. In 1994 a southern secessionist movement led to a brief civil war, and although the secessionists did not succeed, tension still exists between the north and south. Yemen is one of the poorest countries in the Arab world, with a GDP per capita of only $900 and 40% of the population living in poverty. Social Indicators Yemen’s very high population growth rate of 3.46% and its young population led the country to score a 7.8 for demographic pressures in the Failed State Index 2005 (FSI 2005) and the FSI 2006. In June through August of 2004, battles between government troops and the supporters of dissident Shiite cleric Hussein al-Houthi caused people to flee the north, resulting in a score of 8.0 for refugees and displaced persons in the FSI 2005. Despite an influx of refugees from Somalia, this rating decreased to a 6.7 in the FSI 2006 due to al-Houthi’s agreement to renounce his campaign, as well as to government cooperation with the U.N. concerning resettlement of refugees. However, fighting continued, resulting in a high rating of 8.2 for human flight in the FSI 2005 and the FSI 2006. Tribal vendettas have historically been the cause of a great deal of violence in Yemen, which is why the FSI 2005 rated it a 6.4 for group grievances. Tribal violence continued the following year, and the reemergence of al-Houthi’s movement in March 2005 contributed to the increased rating of 7.0 in the FSI 2006. Economic Indicators Uneven economic development was linked to continuing conflict between the north and south, accounting for a rating of 9.0 for both the FSI 2005 and the FSI 2006 for this indicator. Northern Yemen is at an economic advantage compared to the south. The country’s economy improved slightly in the year 2005 due to an increase in oil revenue when prices became higher, causing the rating to improve from 8.8 in the FSI 2005 to 7.8 in the FSI 2006. Political/Military Indicators Corruption is a huge problem at every level and branch of the government. Insider deals, embezzlement, and procurement are all common. State legitimacy improved from a rating of 9.8 in the FSI 2005 to 8.8 in the FSI 2006 because the year 2005 saw parliament’s first-ever challenge to the executive branch in a number of corruption cases. Yemen received a rating of 9.4 for factionalized elites in the FSI 2005 and 2006 because of regional and tribal disputes. Human rights received a rating of 6.4 in the FSI 2005. Police were responsible for arbitrary arrests, torture, and murders, as well as for illegally monitoring citizens. Prison conditions were horrible, and freedom of speech, of the press, and of the right to assemble were all severely limited. In addition, child labor and abuse were prevalent, and violence and discrimination against women were frequent and widespread, as was discrimination against religious minorities. Human rights worsened to 7.2 in the FSI 2006 when, in addition to these continuing abuses, the government used excessive force to suppress the resurgence of al-Houthi’s movement. Considering the lack of civilian protection afforded by the state, as well as inefficiencies in other public services such as education, the FSI 2005 rated Yemen a 9.3 for public services. This rating decreased to 8.2 in the FSI 2006 as various public service organizations struggled to improve and acquire resources. Yemen also received a 9.0 for the security apparatus in the FSI 2005 and the FSI 2006 due to the presence of the Political Security Organization and National Security Bureau, both of which report directly to the President and have committed serious human rights offenses. In addition, has been used as a haven by Islamic militants associated with al-Qaida and other organizations. Although the government, with US assistance, has made efforts to hunt down terrorists, a lack of government capacity has undermined these efforts. Yemen receives a large amount of foreign aid, resulting in a rating of 7.6 in the FSI 2005 for external influence. This rating improved slightly to a 7.5 in the FSI 2006 when Yemen’s economy improved due to increased oil revenue. Core Five State Institutions Leadership Military Police Judiciary Civil Service Poor Poor Poor Weak Weak Yemen became a unified republic in 1990, and has been led by President Ali Abdallah Salih since then. There is corruption in government and little transparency. There are no formal restrictions limiting the organization of opposing parties, but the government has nevertheless made it difficult for opposition parties to organize. Yemen’s military forces are disorganized, and although they managed to suppress both major uprisings of al-Houthi’s followers, they have not been able to put a definitive end to the ongoing violence. The police force, which is also fairly disorganized, has been responsible for numerous human rights violations including arbitrary arrests, torture, and murders. Nor has it been able to protect citizens from violence caused by tribal disputes. Social ties and bribery rule Yemen’s judiciary, and the executive branch of the government often interferes in its affairs. Judges have been harassed, reassigned, and fired for ruling against the government. Police often personally bargain with families and tribesmen concerning the release of prisoners. However, in 2004, the Ministry of Justice attempted to institute a few reforms and conducted conferences around the country to that end, and in 2005 it continued these conferences and other reform efforts. It established two model courts to help women and other underrepresented groups, conducted training for 350 judges on judicial transparency, and implemented a program to reform the infrastructure of eight courts of appeals. The civil service is rife with corruption. There are plans for reform, but for the most part members are underpaid unless they make money through illegal means. Human resources are badly managed. Prognosis Yemen is in need of much improvement. The government needs to work internally to reduce corruption. It has already taken preliminary steps to doing this within the justice system, and if progress becomes more widespread, the country will be in a better position to address other issues. Once the government institutions are strengthened, Yemen may be able to more effectively unify the country through peaceful means and protect its citizens.